

Democracy, in a word, is a social, that is to say, an ethical conception . . . Democracy is a form of government only because it is a form of moral and spiritual association.

Personal responsibility, individual initiation, these are the notes of democracy. . . . There is an individualism in democracy . . . it is an ethical individualism; it is an individualism of freedom, of responsibility, of initiative to and for the ethical ideal.

—John Dewey (1888)

Democracy is the resolved mystery of all constitutions. Here the constitution . . . is returned to its real ground, actual man, the actual people . . . [here] . . . constitution appears as . . . the free product of men.

Democracy is *human existence*, while in the other political forms man has only *legal* existence. That is the fundamental difference of democracy.

—Karl Marx (1859)

[T]he cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy.

—Jane Addams (1902)

Introduction

Democracy as the Political Empowerment of the Citizen: Direct-Deliberative e-Democracy is being published concurrently with its companion volume *Democracy as the Political Empowerment of the People: The Betrayal of an Ideal*. The present volume starts where the companion volume leaves off. *The Betrayal of an Ideal* offers a critical examination of the hitherto-existing theories and regimes of democracy. The primary aim of this examination in *The Betrayal of an Ideal* is to retrieve the ideal of citizens' *direct* participation in the political process and lay the political-theoretical grounds for reclaiming the ideal, which constitutes the subject matter of the present volume. *The Betrayal of an Ideal* sets the stage for arguing that the notion that citizens should have direct and substantive roles in making legislative and policy decisions is a deep-seated idea in the Western tradition of political thought, and constitutes the main ideal (and a primary political-moral component of the idea) of democracy.¹ It further argues that, this ideal (and its moral content) has been sabotaged time and again as the idea of democracy has been subjected to perversion after perversion throughout history. Moreover, *The Betrayal of an Ideal* argues that, with its system of political representation, the "liberal-democratic conception of democracy" represents the latest, and most egregious, version of these perversions.² Finally, it argues in passing that present-day society has all of the material, technological, social-political, and cultural prerequisites necessary for reviving the "original" idea of democracy.

Building upon what *The Betrayal of an Ideal* retrieves, the present volume sets out to formulate a new theory that restores to democracy its ideal of the citizens' direct participation in legislative and political decision-making. As part and parcel of formulating the new theory, this volume develops a philosophical foundation for the now-ubiquitous idea of "*e*-democracy," and uses this foundation to argue that the idea merits serious consideration. The relevance of the idea of *e*-democracy to the task at hand, as this volume argues, lies in that the idea is capable of transforming our understanding of what it means to have citizens directly

participate in the political process in the modern day nation-states, especially in the United States.

The latest innovations in electronic and communications technologies (“e-technologies”) in recent decades, and the ever-growing trend in using their immense powers in all aspects of economic activities and social interactions have given rise to the idea of utilizing these technologies in the service of democracy. In recent years, many enthusiasts of this idea have thought of numerous innovative schemes and methods that could realize this idea. These schemes range from the idea of holding “electronic town meetings” for the purpose of public deliberations and consensus-building to having citizens vote *directly* online on public issues at both the local and national levels.³ A good example of voting online is the experiment that took place in the state of Arizona in the United States on March 7, 2000. In the presidential primary election in this state, the Democratic Party held the world’s first legally binding electronic vote using the Internet.⁴ The Democratic Party repeated the experiment with greater success in Michigan’s presidential primary in February 7, 2004.

For those enthusiasts who interpret democracy literally as the idea of direct self-rule by the people, especially for those who equate the people’s direct self-governance with ancient Athens’ short-lived experience with direct democracy, the new innovations in the electronic and communications technologies are dreams come true. Thanks to these innovations, ancient Athens’ political universe can now be reconstructed in the virtual plane, and its model practiced as a viable alternative to today’s purely representative form of democracy.⁵ The latest innovations in *e*-technologies have made it possible for these enthusiasts to imagine a new form of political universe, a *direct democracy* indeed, where the people themselves have turned into the actual decision-makers, and the professional politicians into the servants of the people in the true sense of the word.

Predisposed to the view that the current fascination with the democratic implications of the new electronic and communication technologies is more than a passing fad and that these technologies have the potential to transform present-day American society’s understanding and practice of democracy, this volume sets out to put the question of what is often referred to as “*e*-democracy” in a philosophical context and use it as a foundation for developing a new theory of democracy that shines the spotlight on the citizens’ direct and deliberative participation in the political process. Toward this end, the present volume argues that the new *e*-technologies and *e*-media not only have provided the impetus for revisiting the original idea of democracy and retrieving the value inherent in the idea of the citizens’ *direct* participation in politics, but also that they have made it possible to reformulate the idea of direct democracy in ways that would make it a viable option and worthy of serious consideration as an alternative approach to the question of democracy in today’s large nation-states.

In formulating this theory, the present volume attempts to conceptualize the idea of the citizens’ direct participation in decision-making in a new way. In sharp contrast to the traditional understanding of the concept that treats democracy as the “political empowerment of the people,” this volume conceptualizes democracy as

an idea that takes the *political empowerment of the citizen* as its primary subject matter. The main problem with conceptualizing democracy as the political empowerment of the people (or “power to the people”) is that it leaves democracy vulnerable to elitist subversions. That is to say, it allows some to argue that it is possible—or actually desirable—for a select group of individuals (whether the elected representatives of the people or their self-appointed guardians) to function as the instruments of the political empowerment of the people. (As *The Betrayal of an Ideal* shows, the elitist subversion is one of the two main senses of the perversion of the idea of democracy.) Conceptualizing democracy as the political empowerment of the individual citizens, the book argues, guards against this defect suffered by the prevailing understanding of democracy.

In conceptualizing democracy as the political empowerment of the individual citizens, the question of empowering the people is then transformed into the question of equally empowering the equal individual citizens who comprise the people. This approach to the question of democracy resurrects the Rousseauian ideas that democracy is about the popular sovereignty and that popular sovereignty cannot be represented. The book relentlessly pursues these ideas and attempts to incorporate them into the existing theoretical framework of the American liberal democracy. This incorporation requires that the sovereign power of the people be “individuated” into the sovereign powers of the individual citizens.⁶ Thus, the question of the exercise of sovereignty by the people becomes the question of the individual citizens exercising their individuated sovereign powers directly. The direct exercise of this power is conceptualized as the direct participation of the individual citizens in making major policy and legislative decisions.

The conception of “democracy as the political empowerment of the citizens” is expressed in terms of two core principles: “the macro principle of the political sovereignty of the individual” and “the micro principle of the ‘social autonomy’ of the individual.” The former principle maintains that political society is to be organized in such a way that the individuals (the citizens) would be empowered to exercise their sovereignty *directly*, and to do so on an *ongoing basis* at macro levels—that is, via *fully expressing their political “wills,” and directly incorporating these expressed wills into collective political decision-making processes* at the national, state, and local levels.⁷ The latter principle, on the other hand, carves out a space for the individual at the micro levels of workplace and community and thus enables her to exercise some degree of autonomy in these social units. (The focus of the book is on the macro principle.) At the heart of the notion of having individuals exercise their sovereign powers and social autonomy in a direct manner lies a multi-layered scheme of electronically-facilitated voting that enables each and every individual to both “fully express” her positions and wills on issues, and to have these expressions “fully incorporated” into the decision-making processes.

On numerous occasions, the book argues that its “conception of democracy as the political empowerment of the citizen” is superior to the “liberal-democratic conception of democracy” which theoretically and constitutionally bars the ordinary citizens’ from having a direct and meaningful participation in the social deci-

sion-making process. On some other occasions, the book argues that its conception of democracy is also superior to the deliberative conceptions which take democracy “as a matter of discourse” and not primarily as a matter of action or direct participation. Deliberative democracy limits the people’s roles in politics to making *potential and indirect contributions* to decision-making, thus falling short of addressing the question of citizens’ *actual and direct participation* in the political sphere. In the deliberative scheme of things, citizens’ deliberations produce “agreed judgements” and “collective verdicts.” However, these judgements and verdicts do not have the status of laws but only that of suggestions, messages, and perhaps mandates that would be delivered to the lawmakers (the political elite, the representatives) to be considered by them at their discretion in making policy or legislative decisions. Thus conceived, deliberative democracy is nothing but the *idealized form* of a pure representative democracy. Theories of deliberative democracy do not and cannot address the question of the people’s sovereignty posed by Rousseau. Rousseau’s criticism of representation as a form of slavery remains relevant to the theories of deliberative democracy.⁸ The book further argues that unlike the theories of participatory and deliberative democracy which attempt to give substance to (and thus strengthen) the democratic component of liberal democracy via weakening its liberal component, the conception of democracy advanced here strengthens both components by giving real substance to both of them.⁹

The driving force behind conceptualizing “democracy as the political empowerment of the citizen” in this book is the conviction that the question of democracy or democratic legitimacy is—not ultimately, but *immediately and directly*—the question of citizens’ political sovereignty. Moreover, democracy or democratic legitimacy is not primarily about giving to people the “freedom of choice” in politics or the “right to choose” their governments (liberal democracy). Nor is it just about securing the “consent” of the people, nor just about establishing “procedures” (liberal democracy) or assuring their “fairness” (deliberative democracy). Nor is this legitimacy just about morally justifying the right or power of authority to make laws (liberal democracy, deliberative democracy); nor just about the “output”—i.e., the “content of outcomes” or “substance”—of decisions made by the authority (participatory democracy, deliberative democracy); but also, and primarily, about the *direct and continuous input* of citizens into the decision-making process. *More than anything, democracy is primarily about individual citizens experiencing political power directly and doing so on an ongoing basis.* Consequently, the yardstick of democratic legitimacy is the degree to which this ideal is realized. Democracy is primarily about providing and facilitating the highest feasible degree of the actual—i.e., *direct and ongoing*—participation by citizens in legislating the fundamental laws they abide by, and in making decisions about the fundamental policies that affect their lives.

As a way of illustrating how this conceptualization of democracy could work in practice, the book constructs a “Realistic Democratic Utopia.” The theoretical-institutional framework of the Realistic Democratic Utopia produces a set of institutional arrangements that would work cooperatively with the existing institutions

of liberal democracy to provide a higher level of democracy than presently available. The institutional arrangements in question would have technological structures that would rely heavily on the latest innovations in the information and communication technologies in order to facilitate citizens' direct participation in making macro decisions. These institutional arrangements would make it possible for citizens to participate both in public deliberations *and* in actual decision-making on major national issues via electronic town hall meetings and electronic voting schemes. Given that public deliberations would be an integral part of this conception, and also given that these institutions would be electronically networked and that voting would take place via electronic media, the theory of democracy developed in this book is referred to as the "theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy."

The book offers a two-track justification for the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy. On the one track, it puts forth the theory as capturing the main ideal of the original idea of democracy, viz., that of citizens' direct participation (and thus remaining true to its original meaning), and offers it as an option that is both viable and worthy of serious consideration as an alternative approach to the question of democracy in today's large and complex nation-state. On the other track, the book presents the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy as a serious contender on the strength of its own justificatory arguments: its developmental argument, and its attempt to provide an essentially proceduralist argument for democracy without losing sight of democracy's substantive and epistemic dimensions. In its developmental argument, the theory links the value it affirms in the idea of the citizens' direct participation to the ideal of the development of the human individual in ways similar to the arguments presented by J. S. Mill, Karl Marx, John Dewey, and C. B. Macpherson. Once the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy is fully elaborated, the book proceeds to argue that the theory has the potential to solve, or dissolve, some of the long-standing questions that have dogged democratic theory throughout its history.

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The formulation of the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy will take place in stages. As the first stage in this endeavor, Chapter 1 will conceptualize democracy as the *political empowerment of the citizen*. This formulation will take place within the confines of the liberal-democratic framework. However, rather than trying to strengthen the democratic pole of the liberal-democratic conception by weakening its liberal pole—which was the strategy of the theories of participatory democracy—this new formulation will attempt to strengthen the democratic component of this conception by breathing substance into its liberal pole. Alternately stated, this approach will attempt to revive the pre-liberal content of the idea of democracy and integrate it into the theoretical fabric of present-day American liberal democracy.

The conceptualization of the idea of democracy as the political empowerment of the citizen will first be presented in the language of "classical" democratic theory, mainly in Rousseau's, and then later will be brought into conformity with the current

language of liberal democracy. This conceptualization will be expressed in terms of two *ideal* principles of the *political sovereignty* and the *social autonomy* of the individual. In *concrete* terms, the idea of the political empowerment of the citizen will be postulated as the power to “*fully express*” one’s political wills and the power to “*fully integrate*” these expressions into the collective policy- and decision-making processes at various levels of society.

As the second stage of formulating the new theory, Chapter 2 will present a discussion of how these two powers can be actualized in present-day American society. Here, the discussion will mainly center on devising a complex collective decision-making scheme that will be referred to as FEFI—(“Full Expression and Full Integration”). The process of developing the scheme in question begins with presenting first a simple system of voting that would give voters virtually infinitely many different ways of expressing their wills and then would incorporate these expressions as inputs into an amalgamation-composition process that would produce a “collective will” or a collective decision. This presentation is then followed by a discussion of a number of potential criticisms that could be directed against the scheme, including the charges that the resulting collective wills would be “inaccurate” and “unfair” expressions of the “will of the people.” Based on this discussion, the scheme will then be revised to produce a more complex system that would be able to deflect most criticisms.

The third stage of formulating the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy will take place in Chapter 3. This will be done by constructing what will be referred to as the “Realistic Democratic Utopia” that will serve as a theoretical framework within which one can attempt to develop a practical model for the actualization of the conception of democracy developed in Chapter 1. The Realistic Democratic Utopia will employ the complex voting scheme developed in Chapter 2 as its primary collective decision-making mechanism. Here it will be argued that present-day society has the necessary technological infrastructure and other relevant material prerequisites for realizing the idea of the Realistic Democratic Utopia.

The basic model for citizens’ direct participation in collective decision-making in the Realistic Democratic Utopia would be as follows: before a vote on a “major” bill, issue, or policy takes place, there would be ample discussions and informative sessions that would help citizens educate themselves on the issues for a specified number of weeks or months. These sessions would be directed primarily by the “guardians of the public interests” (the elected “experts” and “trustees” of the people) both in person (in the local community and town meetings) and in the media (including the “electronic town meetings” and various television channels and radio stations publicly funded and operated solely for this purpose). During these sessions or in their aftermath, citizens would debate and deliberate both on the virtual plane (whether one-to-one or through “electronic town meetings” and online discussion forums, and in the mass media) and in the actual world in public places (e.g., the workplace, local community meetings, “civic homes,” “local talk shops,” and social gatherings).¹⁰ Then, at a specified day and time block, the citizens would vote by using their electronic voting cards and PINs in conveniently-located and secured voting precincts (or possibly on the Internet). The elected policy “experts” and the

“trustees” of the people, as well as the members of the Congress, would also vote on the issue in their respective assemblies in the same time and day block. The aggregated votes of citizens would be weighed against the aggregated votes of the “guardians,” representatives, and senators in accordance with a set of carefully developed formulas. Higher popular participation in voting would assign higher weight to the votes of the citizens, in comparison to the votes of the guardians and representatives. Moreover, the voting scheme employed would not be the existing monosyllabic yes or no. Rather, it would be a multi-layered scheme that would allow each and every individual to “fully express” her views and “wills” (both private and public), as well as having these expressions “fully incorporated” into the decision-making process.¹¹

As the fourth and final stage in formulating the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy, Chapter 4 brings together the “conception of democracy as the political empowerment of the citizen” (developed in Chapter 1), the voting scheme of Chapter 2, and the theoretical-institutional framework of the Realistic Democratic Utopia (explored in Chapter 3), and synthesizes them into a single theory. This synthesis takes place against the backdrop of the “liberal-democratic conception of democracy.” The main political value affirmed by the “theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy” is the value inherent in the principle of the citizens’ direct participation in the legislation of the major laws by which they abide. The second political value affirmed by the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy is the principle that social-political decision-making ought to be embedded in knowledge, moral understanding, and virtue.

It is argued in Chapter 4 that the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy, first and foremost, is committed to the realization of the idea of the unencumbered and fullest feasible (positive) development of the human individual, which it regards as the ultimate value of the human universe and society’s *raison d’être*. Moreover, it is argued that the theory is built around a faith in the abilities of ordinary citizens to make sound political decisions. Furthermore, the hallmark of the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy is that it rests on a thick notion of sovereignty. The theory is relentless in the pursuit of the idea that democracy is primarily to be identified with the individual citizens’ *actual, direct, and continuous* exercise of sovereignty (i.e., their *direct and continuous participation* in social decision-making on major issues). On this question, the theory diverges considerably from the liberal-democratic conception, which is premised on a limited, indirect, and intermittent-periodic exercise of sovereignty by citizens that takes place exclusively during the election of representatives. Another feature of the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy is that its thick notion of sovereignty is coupled with a thin notion of equality in the realm of material holdings. Though this thin egalitarianism of the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy goes against the grain of tradition in the “classical theory” of democracy, it is nevertheless a consequence of developing the theory within a liberal-democratic framework.

The Conclusion revisits some of the themes discussed in Chapters 1-4, and in *The Betrayal of an Ideal*, and further develops some of the arguments presented earlier. It argues that the ultimate guarantor of a responsible government—as well as

the true remedy for the democratic shortcomings of liberal democracy—is a *government “by” the people* where individual citizens directly participate in performing some of the legislative and policy-making functions of governing. The Conclusion also suggests that some of the longstanding issues and problems in political theory and the theory of government can be solved or resolved by the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy. Four such questions are treated in greater details than others. First, it is argued that direct-deliberative *e*-democracy resolves the dichotomy drawn by Benjamin Constant between the “liberty of the ancients” and the “liberty of moderns.”¹² Second, it is argued that direct-deliberative *e*-democracy makes it possible for a democratic society to assimilate those aspects of Plato’s guardianship theory of government that makes it attractive, viz., the idea that social-political rule ought to be embedded in knowledge, moral understanding, and virtue. Third, the Conclusion argues that the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy can lay claim to offering a solution to a fundamental philosophical problem that hounded ancient and early modern political thought, namely, the now-forgotten problem of reconciling the idea of governing by the consent of the ruled with the equally desirable (yet elitist) idea of governing in accordance with principles of reason and wisdom. Finally, as an extension of the discussion of the first question, the Conclusion suggests that the theory of direct-deliberative *e*-democracy can be viewed in some respects as a unique synthesis that unifies, in a coherent fashion, the liberal theory of government (the idea of liberal constitution and liberal institutional arrangements) with the most compelling features of republican political thought (the ideas of public-spirited political culture and active citizenship).

Notes

1. In treating democracy as a normative concept, *The Betrayal of an Ideal* defined democracy as meaning “rule by the people,” or as citizens having the *actual* and *direct* sovereign authority in the state. (This is the “original” definition of the idea.) Starting with this definition, *The Betrayal of an Ideal* postulated democracy in terms of a set of moral-political values that were associated with democracy in its original formulation. These values were expressed in terms of three *ideals* that *The Betrayal of an Ideal* regarded as having guided the theory and practice of ancient Athenians. These ideals were: (1) the ideal of the *direct participation* of citizens in legislative and policy decision-making, (2) the ideal of *substantive equality*, and (3) the ideal of *public deliberation*. *The Betrayal of an Ideal* privileged the ideal of direct participation as the “true” and “main” ideal of democracy—and its primary moral component—over the ideals of equality and deliberation for two reasons. First, this ideal needs to be the focus of attention for it has suffered the most sabotage in the past and, at the same time, has received the least attention in the recent literature devoted to the goal of retrieving the moral content of democracy. Second, the values inherent in the ideal of direct participation is directly linked to the values associated with the ideal of the full and positive development of the human individual which, in Chapter 1 of this volume, will be privileged as the ultimate value of the human universe. See Chapter 1 of *The Betrayal of an Ideal* for further details.

2. The “liberal-democratic conception of democracy” was introduced in Part II of *The Betrayal of an Ideal*. Briefly stated, this conception regards democracy as the idea of the rule by a freely and popularly elected representative government. Part II faulted this conception for being elitist. It also took issue with the purely representative form of government prescribed by this conception as it argued that this form of government is more attuned to the interests of the propertied classes, and is ultimately tantamount to political disempowerment of the people. Part III of *The Betrayal of an Ideal* went a step further and characterized the “liberal-democratic conception of democracy” in its most recent manifestation as “audience democracy” and “fund democracy.”

3. A survey of some of these ideas is provided in the opening section of Chapter 3.

4. A privately owned company named Election.Com conducted this election.

5. For instance, Rheingold speaks of “Athens without slaves,” and expresses the optimism that “computer-mediated communications” (CMC) could “revitalize citizen-based democracy” and could “have democratizing potential in the way that alphabets and printing presses had democratizing potentials” (Rheingold 1993, p.14 and p.279, respectively).

6. As will be seen in Chapter 1, the notion of the “individuating” sovereignty does not contradict Rousseau’s claim that sovereignty is “indivisible.”

7. It should be noted at the outset that throughout this work, the term “will” is used in a technical sense. A “will,” as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1, denotes a “public judgement”; that is to say, a particular sort of opinion on a given issue that; a) is well-informed and educated on the issue and has the knowledge of alternatives, b) is subjected to reflection on the basis of moral considerations and reasonableness, c) is preferably scrutinized in public deliberations, and d) has the “force of the commitment” of the individual citizen who holds it. As will be seen in Chapter 1, an individual citizen may have more than one “will” on any given public issue.

8. Theories of deliberative democracy are discussed in Chapter 13 of *The Betrayal of an Ideal*. Concisely stated, the fundamental idea defining theories of deliberative democracy is the contention that democracy derives its legitimacy from the participation of the citizens in public *deliberations* on the issues of concern to the society. In the words of Joshua Cohen, one of the original proponents of the idea, “[t]he notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds throughout public argument and reasoning among equal citizens. Citizens in such an order share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic institutions as legitimate insofar as they establish the framework for free public deliberation” (Cohen 1997a, p.72). *The Betrayal of an Ideal* faulted theories of deliberative democracy for ignoring the democratic ideal of *direct* participation, and thus for their inability to overcome the two glaring democratic shortcomings of liberal-democracy, which it characterized as “audience democracy” and “fund democracy.”

9. Theories of participatory democracy are discussed in Chapter 12 of *The Betrayal of an Ideal*. Briefly stated, theories of participatory democracy came out of the movements of the 1960s and were keen on emphasizing the moral substance of democracy, as well as emphasizing the importance of citizens’ participation in the public life—at the level of community (the version promoted by the “Students for a Democratic Society”), at the workplace (Carole Pateman’s version), and in the political decision-making about economic life (C. B. Macpherson’s version). While Pateman emphasized the education utility and community-bonding effects of democratic participation, Macpherson focused primarily on retrieving the moral content of democracy, as he posited democracy as “a set

of moral ends.” Macpherson regarded this content primarily as *substantive* (i.e., economic) equality—to be contrasted with the *formal* interpretation of equality in liberal-democracy. For Macpherson, the project of retrieving the moral content of democracy was closely linked to the goal of dethroning the “market morality” and market-based conceptions of Man, and thus ultimately to reclaiming Man as an ethical being and a developer of his human capacities.

10. The phrases “civic homes” and “local talk shops” are borrowed from Barber (1984), p.271 and p.268. The main idea behind these institutions is discussed in Chapter 13 of *The Betrayal of an Ideal*, and will be further discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 in this volume.

11. There would be about 10-12 “major” issues to be decided annually (an average of 3 issues in each voting occasion, scheduled 4 times a year). Examples of major issues would be the national education policy and annual budget planning. On each major issue, voters would choose among a meaningful range of options by a scheme that will give them virtually infinitely many different ways of expressing their views. They would also have the “protest option” in case they are dissatisfied with the range or meaningfulness of the options presented to them on the ballot. The protest option can also function as a “veto vote” if it draws a specified percentage of the votes. A “veto vote” is an indication that voters did not approve of the policy options presented to them and the agenda-setters must put together another set of policy options based on studying the results and then schedule another public voting session.

12. According to Constant, the ancients exercised direct sovereignty while suffering from the lack of negative civil liberties. On the other hand, the moderns, living in liberal societies, have negative civil liberties while being deprived of exercising sovereignty directly. Constant—in his address to the *Athenee Royale* in 1819—argued that it is not possible to combine direct sovereignty with civil liberties. See Constant (1988), pp.309-28 for the full text of his speech.